Er war ein radikaler Kirchenkritiker. Im Jahrhundert verurteilte John Wyclif den Machtanspruch des Papstes und den Reichtum der Kirche. John Wyclif (sein Name wird auch als Wycliff oder Wycliffe geschrieben) wurde um in einer kleinen Adelsfamilie in Wycliffe, Yorkshire, geboren. Er schloss. John Wyclif, auch Wicklyf, Wicliffe, Wiclef, Wycliff, Wycliffe, genannt Doctor evangelicus, war ein englischer Philosoph, Theologe und Kirchenreformer.
John Wyclif Seine Lehre wird von den Lollarden überall verbreitet
John Wyclif, auch Wicklyf, Wicliffe, Wiclef, Wycliff, Wycliffe, genannt Doctor evangelicus, war ein englischer Philosoph, Theologe und Kirchenreformer. John Wyclif [ˈwɪklɪf], auch Wicklyf, Wicliffe, Wiclef, Wycliff, Wycliffe, genannt Doctor evangelicus (* spätestens in Hipswell, Yorkshire; † Dezember. Der englische Theologe John Wyclif (ca. – ) war seiner Zeit voraus. Warum aber wurden seine Gebeine ausgegraben? Und warum. Ein Kritiker der bestehenden Kirche. John Wyclif () © S.H.P.F.. John Wiclif entstammt einer kleinadligen Familie aus. John Wyclif übersetzte in England als erster die Bibel in die Landessprache und ging in die Kirchengeschichte ein. Er bekämpfte den Papst und die damals. Select English Works of John Wyclif. von John Wycliffe Wycliffe und Thomas Arnold Arnold | November. Er war ein radikaler Kirchenkritiker. Im Jahrhundert verurteilte John Wyclif den Machtanspruch des Papstes und den Reichtum der Kirche.
John Wyclif ist einer der Reformatoren, die vor Luther bereits viel von dessen Kritikpunkten vorwegnahmen. Im England des Jahrhundert. Der englische Theologe John Wyclif (ca. – ) war seiner Zeit voraus. Warum aber wurden seine Gebeine ausgegraben? Und warum. Er war ein radikaler Kirchenkritiker. Im Jahrhundert verurteilte John Wyclif den Machtanspruch des Papstes und den Reichtum der Kirche.
John Wyclif Subscriber Login VideoBefore Luther: John Wycliffe and Jan Hus
John Wyclif Academic Tools VideoDer Morgenstern - John Wycliff und die Reformation in England (Folge 2)
John Wyclif Stephen Edmund Lahey VideoPelícula Cristiana - John Wycliffe, La Estrella De La Mañana
John Wyclif - Ein Kritiker der bestehenden KircheDer Oxforder Theologe ist damit ein Wegbereiter der Reformation. Der nun, nach dieser nächtlichen Aktion in der Kirche der "Damnatio Memoriae" - der endgültigen Auslöschung aus dem Gedächtnis der Nachwelt - anheimfallen soll?
The first step, which carried him to the outbreak of the schism , involves moderate recognition of the papal primacy ; the second, which carried him to , is marked by an estrangement from the papacy; and the third shows him in sharp contest.
In keeping with Wycliffe's belief that scripture was the only authoritative reliable guide to the truth about God, he became involved in efforts to translate the Bible into English.
While Wycliffe is credited, it is not possible exactly to define his part in the translation, which was based on the Vulgate.
From him comes the translation of the New Testament , which was smoother, clearer, and more readable than the rendering of the Old Testament by his friend Nicholas of Hereford.
The whole was revised by Wycliffe's younger contemporary John Purvey in There still exist about manuscripts, complete or partial, containing the translation in its revised form.
From this, one may easily infer how widely diffused it was in the 15th century. For this reason the Wycliffites in England were often designated by their opponents as "Bible men".
In the summer of Wycliffe formulated his doctrine of the Lord's Supper in twelve short sentences, and made it a duty to advocate it everywhere. Then the English hierarchy proceeded against him.
The chancellor of the University of Oxford had some of the declarations pronounced heretical. When this was announced to Wycliffe, he declared that no one could change his convictions.
He then appealed — not to the pope nor to the ecclesiastical authorities of the land, but to the king. He published his great confession upon the subject and also a second writing in English intended for the common people.
As long as Wycliffe limited his attacks to abuses and the wealth of the Church, he could rely on the support of part of the clergy and aristocracy, but once he dismissed the traditional doctrine of transubstantiation , his theses could not be defended any more.
In the midst of this came the Peasants' Revolt of The revolt was sparked in part by Wycliffe's preaching carried throughout the realm by "poor priests" appointed by Wycliffe mostly laymen.
The preachers didn't limit their criticism of the accumulation of wealth and property to that of the monasteries, but rather included secular properties belonging to the nobility as well.
In Wycliffe's old enemy William Courtenay , now Archbishop of Canterbury, called an ecclesiastical assembly of notables at London. During the consultations on 21 May an earthquake occurred; the participants were terrified and wished to break up the assembly, but Courtenay declared the earthquake a favourable sign which meant the purification of the earth from erroneous doctrine, and the result of the " Earthquake Synod " was assured.
Of the 24 propositions attributed to Wycliffe without mentioning his name, ten were declared heretical and fourteen erroneous. The former had reference to the transformation in the sacrament, the latter to matters of church order and institutions.
It was forbidden from that time to hold these opinions or to advance them in sermons or in academic discussions. All persons disregarding this order were to be subject to prosecution.
To accomplish this the help of the State was necessary; but the Commons rejected the bill. The king, however, had a decree issued which permitted the arrest of those in error.
The citadel of the reformatory movement was Oxford, where Wycliffe's most active helpers were; these were laid under the ban and summoned to recant, and Nicholas of Hereford went to Rome to appeal.
On 17 November , Wycliffe was summoned before a synod at Oxford. He still commanded the favour of the court and of Parliament, to which he addressed a memorial.
He was neither excommunicated then, nor deprived of his living. Wycliffe aimed to do away with the existing hierarchy and replace it with the "poor priests" who lived in poverty, were bound by no vows, had received no formal consecration , and preached the Gospel to the people.
Itinerant preachers spread the teachings of Wycliffe. The bull of Gregory XI impressed upon them the name of Lollards , intended as an opprobrious epithet, but it became, to them, a name of honour.
Even in Wycliffe's time the "Lollards" had reached wide circles in England and preached "God's law, without which no one could be justified. In the years before his death in he increasingly argued for Scriptures as the authoritative centre of Christianity, that the claims of the papacy were unhistorical, that monasticism was irredeemably corrupt, and that the moral unworthiness of priests invalidated their office and sacraments.
The Anti-Wycliffite Statute of extended persecution to Wycliffe's remaining followers. The "Constitutions of Oxford" of aimed to reclaim authority in all ecclesiastical matters, and specifically named John Wycliffe as it banned certain writings, and noted that translation of Scripture into English by unlicensed laity was a crime punishable by charges of heresy.
The Council of Constance declared Wycliffe a heretic on 4 May , and banned his writings, effectively both excommunicating him retroactively and making him an early forerunner of Protestantism.
The Council decreed that Wycliffe's works should be burned and his bodily remains removed from consecrated ground. This order, confirmed by Pope Martin V , was carried out in None of Wycliffe's contemporaries left a complete picture of his person, his life, and his activities.
Paintings representing Wycliffe are from a later period. In the history of the trial by William Thorpe , Wycliffe appears wasted and physically weak.
Thorpe says Wycliffe was of unblemished walk [ clarification needed ] in life, and regarded affectionately by people of rank, who often consorted with him, took down his sayings, and clung to him.
Thomas Netter highly esteemed John Kynyngham in that he "so bravely offered himself to the biting speech of the heretic and to words that stung as being without the religion of Christ".
But this example of Netter is not well chosen, since the tone of Wycliffe toward Kynyngham is that of a junior toward an elder whom one respects, and he handled other opponents in similar fashion.
Wycliffe was the most prominent English philosopher of the second half of the 14th century. Henry Knighton says that in philosophy he was second to none, and in scholastic discipline incomparable.
His first book, De Logica , explores the fundamentals of Scholastic Theology. He believed that "one should study Logic in order to better understand the human mind because The centre of Wycliffe's philosophical system is formed by the doctrine of the prior existence in the thought of God of all things and events.
While Platonic realism would view "beauty' as a property that exists in an ideal form independently of any mind or thing, "for Wycliffe every universal , as part of creation, derived its existence from God, the Creator".
A second key point of Wycliffe's is his emphasis on the notion of divine Lordship, explored in De dominio Divino c.
The practical application of this for Wycliffe was seen in the rebellious attitude of individuals particulars towards rightful authority universals.
In De civili dominio he discusses the appropriate circumstance under which an entity may be seen as possessing authority over lesser subjects.
Dominium is always conferred by God. So far as his relations to the philosophers of the Middle Ages are concerned, he held to realism as opposed to the nominalism advanced by William of Ockham.
A number of Wycliffe's ideas have been carried forward in the twentieth century by philosopher and Reformed theologian Cornelius Van Til. Wycliffe's fundamental principle of the preexistence in thought of all reality involves the most serious obstacle to freedom of the will; the philosopher could assist himself only by the formula that the free will of man was something predetermined of God.
He demanded strict dialectical training as the means of distinguishing the true from the false, and asserted that logic or the syllogism furthered the knowledge of catholic verities; ignorance of logic was the reason why men misunderstood Scripture, since men overlooked the connection, the distinction between idea and appearance.
Wycliffe was not merely conscious of the distinction between theology and philosophy, but his sense of reality led him to pass by scholastic questions.
He left aside philosophical discussions that seemed to have no significance for the religious consciousness and those that pertained purely to scholasticism : "We concern ourselves with the verities that are, and leave aside the errors which arise from speculation on matters which are not.
Wycliffe was instrumental in the development of a translation of the Bible in English, thus making it accessible to laypeople. He also had a strong influence on Jan Hus.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. English theologian. For the ship, see John Wickliffe ship. For other uses and other people, see Wycliffe.
Fictional portrait of Wycliffe, c. Hipswell , Yorkshire , England. Lutterworth , Leicestershire , England . Main category: Bible translations into English.
Saints portal. Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 26 October Late Medieval Theologian , Leiden: Brill, , pp. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Retrieved 3 June Louis, p. John Boyd. Retrieved 26 October — via Google Books. Oxford: Balliol College. Retrieved 22 August Renaissance and Reformation.
Eerdmans Publishing. Fisher Unwin. Retrieved 26 October — via Internet Archive. New York: Robert Appleton Company, John Wyclif.
Oxford University Press. Religious Tract Society. The premature Reformation: Wycliffite texts and Lollard history.
Oxford: Clarendon. Wyclif society. A History of the Christian Church. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. He thought of logic as turning on structural forms, independent of both their semantic contents and the mental acts by which they are grasped.
It is through these forms that the network connecting the basic constituents of the world individuals and universals, substances and accidents, concrete properties, like being-white, and abstract forms, like whiteness is disclosed to us.
His peculiar analysis of predication and his own formulation of the Scotistic formal distinction are logically necessary requirements of this philosophical approach.
When the objects at issue are categorial items, and among what differentiates them is their own individual being, the objects differ essentially.
If the objects share the same individual being and what differentiates them is at least one of their concrete metaphysical components or features , then the objects differ really , whereas if what differentiates them is one of their abstract metaphysical components, then they differ formally.
It explains why one and the same thing is at the same time an atomic state of affairs and how many different beings can constitute just one thing.
Wyclif explains the notion of formal distinction or difference in the Purgans errores circa universalia in communi chap.
In the Tractatus de universalibus chap. He does not define the real-and-essential difference, but identifies it through a rough account of its three sub-types.
The things that differ really-and-essentially are those that differ from each other either i in genus, like man and quantity, or ii in species, like man and donkey, or iii in number, like two human beings.
The real-but-not-essential difference is more subtle than the first kind, since it holds between things that are the same single essence but really differ from each other nevertheless — like memory, reason, and will, which are one and the same soul, and the three Persons of the Holy Trinity, who are the one and same God.
The third main kind of difference is the formal one. It is described as the difference by which things differ from each other even though they are constitutive elements of the same single essence or supposit.
According to Wyclif, this is the case for:. This account of the various kinds of distinctions is more detailed than that of the Purgans errores circa universalia in communi , but not more clear.
What is the difference, for instance, between the definition of the real-but-not-essential distinction and the definition of the formal distinction?
What feature do all the kinds of formal distinction agree in? Some points are obvious, however:. The main apparent dissimilarities between the analyses proposed in the Tractatus de universalibus and in the Purgans errores circa universalia in communi are the following:.
Wyclif presents his opinion on universals as intermediate between those ones of St. Thomas and Giles of Rome and Walter Burley. Like Giles, whom he quotes by name, Wyclif recognizes three main kinds of universals:.
The ideas in God are the causes of the formal universals, and the formal universals are the causes of the intentional universals. On the other hand, like Burley, Wyclif holds that formal universals exist in actu outside our minds, not in potentia as moderate Realists thought — even though, unlike Burley, he maintains they are really identical with their own individuals.
So Wyclif accepts the traditional realistic account of the relationship between universals and individuals, but translates it into the terms of his own system.
According to him, universals and individuals are really the same, but formally distinct, since they share the same empirical reality that of individuals but, considered as universals and individuals, they have opposite constituent principles.
On the logical side, this means that, notwithstanding real identity, not all that is predicated of individuals can be directly predicated of universals or vice versa , though an indirect predication is always possible.
Therefore Wyclif distinguished three main types of predication, which he conceived as a real relation that holds between metaphysical entities.
In the Purgans errores circa universalia in communi chap. In the Tractatus de universalibus , formal predication, essential predication, and habitudinal predication are described as three non-exclusive ways of predicating, each more general than the preceding.
We speak of causal predication when the form designated by the predicate term is not present in the entity signified by the subject term, but is something caused by that entity.
No instances of this kind of predication are given by Wyclif. Formal predication, essential predication, and habitudinal predication are defined in almost the same way in the Purgans errores circa universalia and in the Tractatus de universalibus.
Formal predication is that in which the form designated by the predicate term is directly present in the entity signified by the subject term.
This happens whenever an item in the categorial line is predicated of something inferior, or an accident is predicated of its subject of inherence.
In fact, in both cases, the subject term and the predicate term refer to the same reality in virtue of the form connoted by the predicate term itself.
To speak of essential predication, it is sufficient that the same empirical reality is both the real subject and the predicate, even though the formal principle connoted by the predicate term differs from that connoted by the subject term.
In fact, the same empirical reality or essence that is a universal is also an individual, but the forms connoted by the subject term and by the predicate term differ from each other.
Finally we speak of habitudinal predication when the form connoted by the predicate term does not inhere, either directly or indirectly, in the essence designated by the subject, but simply implies a relation to it, so that the same predicate may be at different times truly or falsely spoken of its subject without there being any change in the subject itself.
According to Wyclif, we use such a kind of predication mainly when we want to express theological truths, like: God is known and loved by many creatures, and brings about, as efficient, exemplar, and final cause, many good effects.
It is evident that habitudinal predication does not require any kind of identity between the entity signified by the subject term and the entity signified by the predicate term, but formal predication and essential predication do.
So the ontological presuppositions of the most general type of predication, implied by the other types, are completely different from those of the other two.
As a result, the copula of the philosophical propositions that are dealt with cannot be extensionally interpreted, since it does not properly mean that a given object is a member of a certain set or that a given set is included in another; rather it means degrees of identity.
On the one hand, Wyclif believed that thought was linguistically constrained by its own nature; on the other hand, he considered thought to be related to reality in its elements and constitution.
Hence he deemed language, thought, and external reality to be of the same logical coherence see Conti , pp. Within this context, the theory of supposition was intended to explain the different roles that words or phrases can have in relation to language and the extra-mental world when they appear as extremes that is, as subject or predicate in propositions.
Characteristically, his theory of supposition provides an account not only of the truth-values of a sentence, but also of its meaning; it is not therefore simply a theory of reference, but a sort of complex analysis of language viewed as a semiotic system whose unique interpretative model was the reality itself.
Wyclif defines supposition as the signification of one categorematic extreme of a proposition subject or predicate in relation to the other extreme De logica , chap.
In fact, 1 signification consisted in the relation of a linguistic sign to what it signifies apart from any propositional context; 2 a word capable of standing for something else or for itself in a proposition had first to have signification; 3 a term only had supposition in a propositional context; and 4 the kind of supposition a term had depended on its propositional context.
In any case, in a traditional realist perspective, supposition served to tell us which things are involved in the truth-conditions of a given sentence: whether they are expressions, real universals, or individuals.
At the very beginning of the chapter on supposition, like Walter Burley, Wyclif divides supposition into improper, in which a term stands for something different from its primary significatum by special custom ex usu loquendi , and proper, in which a term stands for something by the virtue of the expression itself.
So a term has improper supposition when it is used in a figurative speech. Formal supposition is twofold: simple and personal.
Simple supposition is divided into equal and unequal. The supposition is personal when the term which plays the role of subject in a sentence stands for one or more individuals.
The personal and common supposition is twofold. If the term stands for many singulars considered together, the supposition is a personal universal supposition personalis universalis.
In turn, the personal universal supposition is divided into confused and distributive confusa distributiva and merely confused confusa tantum.
The confused suppositions are so called since they involve many different individuals, and this is the case for the subject of a universal affirmative proposition De logica , chap.
Wyclif takes a resolutely realist stand, as his formulation and division of supposition where simple supposition is described as that possessed by a term in relation to a universal outside the intellect and personal supposition as that possessed by a term in relation to one or more individual make evident.
In his De suppositionibus and De puritate artis logicae Burley had adopted a semantic point of view in describing supposition, since he had defined formal supposition as the supposition that a term has when it stands for its own significatum or for the individual items which fall under it.
In the first case, we properly speak of simple supposition, and in the second, we speak of personal supposition. Wyclif makes clear what Burley had stated only implicitly: the significatum of a common term is always a common nature that is, a universal form really existing outside the intellect.
This fits in with his theory of meaning and his ontology. In the first chapter of his treatise on logic De logica , chap. It is worth noticing that in defining concrete terms Wyclif a plainly attributes the capacity for suppositing to things; b does not clarify the metaphysical composition of such things signified by concrete terms; and c describes the twofold supposition of concrete terms as a sort of signification.
A term of first intention is a sign which signifies without connoting the properties of being-individual or being-universal which characterize categorial items.
On the contrary, a term of second intention is a term which connotes such properties and refers to a common nature without naming it.
He affirms that everything which exists signifies in a complex manner that it is something real De logica , chap.
Singular expressions name and signify individuals, albeit general terms name and signify common natures. Furthermore, he holds that 1 common terms of the category of substance, when used predicatively, specified which kind of substance a certain individual substance is; 2 individual substances are unique physical entities, located at a particular place in space and time; and 3 universal substances are the specific or generic natures proper to the individual substances, immanent in them, and apt to be common to many individuals at the same time.
As a result, like Burley, Wyclif thinks of universals and individuals as linked together by a sort of relation of instantiation.
In other words, he conceives of individuals as the tokens of universal natures, and universal natures as the types of individuals.
This consequence is common also to many other Realist authors of the 13th and 14th centuries. According to them, any concrete accidental term which occurs as an extreme in a proposition can stand for 1 the substrate of inherence of the accidental form that it connotes suppositio personalis , or 2 the accidental form itself suppositio abstractiva , or 3 the aggregate composed of the individual substance, which plays the role of the substrate of the form, and the singular accidental form at issue suppositio concretiva so, for instance, William Penbygull in his treatise on universals.
Wyclif ends chapter 12 of his De logica with three notanda pp. In the first one, he recalls that categorematic common concrete terms can supposit both personaliter and simpliciter at once mixtim when the propositions where they occur as subjects are universal affirmative or indefinite.
Finally, in the third one, he lays down the following rules about the supposition possessed by the subject-term and the predicate-term in the Square of Oppositions: 1 in every universal affirmative proposition, the subject supposits mobiliter , that is: it has confused and distributive supposition, while the predicate has suppositio confusa tantum or simple.
The supposition is merely confused if it does not allow for descent to a certain singular nor a universal — in other words, a predicate- term has the supposition confusa tantum when it is used attributively of its extension.
According to him, by promising a singular, a universal is promised secundarie and confuse , and conversely ibid. This does not mean that the universal-coin is a sort of third coin over and above the two coins in my hands.
Wyclif had already rejected this mistaken conclusion in the previous chapter of the Logicae continuatio. He argues that to add the universal-man as a third man to Socrates and Plato, given that there are only these two individual men in the world, exhibits a fallacy of equivocation.
As a consequence the universal cannot be counted with its individuals — and in fact any universal is really identical to each one of its individuals, and so it cannot differ in number from each of them ibid.
Wyclif, like Scotus, claims that the notion of being is the most general one, a notion entailed by all others, but he also states that an extra-mental reality corresponds to the concept of being-in-general ens in communi.
This extra-mental reality is predicated of everything God and creatures, substances and accidents, universal and individual essences according to different degrees, since God is in the proper sense of the term and any other entity is something real only insofar as it shares the being of God De ente in communi , chap.
If being is a reality, it is then clear that it is impossible to affirm its univocity. The Doctor Subtilis thought of being as simply a concept, and therefore could describe it as univocal in a broad sense one name — one concept — many natures.
Wyclif, on the contrary, is convinced that the being-in-general is an extra-mental reality, so he works out his theory at a different level than does Scotus: no more at the intensional level the meaning connected with the univocal sign, or univocum univocans , but at the extensional one the thing signified by the mental sign, considered as shared by different entities according to different degrees.
For that reason, he cannot use Aristotelian univocation, which hides these differences in sharing. Thus he denies the univocity of being and prefers to use one of the traditional notions of analogy De ente praedicamentali , chap.
Therefore he qualifies being as an ambiguous genus ibidem , p. The analogy of being does not entail a multiplicity of correlated meanings, however, as in Thomas Aquinas.
Since Wyclif hypostatizes the notion of being and considers equivocity, analogy, and univocity as real relations between things, not as semantic relations between terms and things, his analogy is partially equivalent to the standard Aristotelian univocity, since what differentiates analogy from univocity is the way a certain nature or property is shared by a set of things: analogous things analoga share it according to different degrees secundum magis et minus , or secundum prius et posterius , while univocal things univoca share it all in the same manner and at the same degree.
This is the true sense of his distinction between ambiguous genera, like being and accident accidens , and logical genera, like substance De ente praedicamentali , chap.
Hence, according to this account, being in general is the basic component of the metaphysical structure of each reality, which possesses it in accordance with its own nature, value, and position in the hierarchy of created beings.
Unfortunately, this theory is weak in an important point, since Wyclif does not clarify the relation between being-in-general and God.
On the one hand, being is a creature, the first of all the creatures; on the other hand, God should share it, as being-in-general is the most common reality, predicated of all, and according to him to-be-predicated-of something means to-be-shared-by it.
As a consequence, a creature would be in some respect superordinated to God — a theological puzzle that Wyclif failed to acknowledge.
According to Wyclif, the constitutive property of each kind of being is the capacity to be the object of a complex act of signifying De ente in communi , chap.
This choice implies a revolution in the standard medieval theory of transcendentals, since Wyclif actually replaces being ens with true verum.
According to the common belief, among the transcendentals being, thing, one, something, true, good being was the primitive notion, from which all the others stemmed by adding a specific connotation in relation to something else, or by adding some new determination.
So true verum was nothing but being ens itself considered in relation to an intellect, no matter whether divine or human.
According to the English philosopher, only what can be signified by a complex expression is a being, and whatever is the proper object of an act of signifying is a truth.
Truth is therefore the true name of being itself Tractatus de universalibus , chap. Thus everything that is is a truth, and every truth is something not simple but complex.
From the semantic point of view, this means the collapsing of the fundamental distinction in the common Aristotelian theory of meaning, the one between simple signs like nouns and compound signs like propositions.
From the ontological point of view, this entails the uniqueness in type of what is signified by every class of categorematic expressions Logica , chap.
According to him, from the metaphysical point of view a singular man is nothing but a real proposition propositio realis , where actual existence in time as an individual plays the role of the subject, the common nature i.
According to the supporters of the complexe significabile theory, the same things that are signified by simple concrete terms are signified by complex expressions or propositions.
When we conceive of a thing in a complex manner, we consider that thing according to its metaphysical structure, and so according to its many levels of being and kinds of essence.
But these metaphysical atoms are not simple but rather composite, because they are reducible to something else, belonging to a different rank of reality and unable to exist by themselves: being and essence, potency and act, matter and form, abstract genera, species and differences.
Among the many kinds of beings Wyclif lists, the most important set is that consisting of categorial beings. They are characterized by the double fact of having a nature and of being the constitutive elements of finite corporeal beings or atomic states of affairs.
According to Wyclif, being is the stuff that the ten categories modulate according to their own nature, so that everything is immediately something that is De ente praedicamentali , chap.
The essences of creatures do not precede their beings, not even causally, since every thing is identical with its essence.
The being of a thing is brought into existence by God at the same instant as its essence, since essence without being and being without essence would be two self-contradictory states of affairs.
In fact, essence without being would imply that an individual could be something of a given type without being real in any way, and being without essence would imply that there could be the existence of a thing without the thing itself Tractatus de universalibus , chap.
As a consequence, the pars destruens of his theory of being and essence is a strong refutation of the twin opinions of St.
Thomas and Giles of Rome. Although Wyclif does not name either the Dominican master or the Augustinian one, it is nevertheless clear from the context that their conceptions are the object of his criticisms ibid.
On the other hand, it is evident that while from the extensional point of view the being and essence of creatures are equipollent, since every being is an essence and vice versa , from the intensional point of view there is a difference, because the being of a thing logically presupposes its essence and not vice versa De materia et forma , chap.
Indeed, he clearly distinguishes between singular essence and universal essence essentia quidditativa speciei vel generis — that is, the traditional forma partis and forma totius.
The singular essence is the form that in union with the matter brings about the substantial composite. The universal essence is the type that the former instantiates; it is present in the singular substance as a constitutive part of its nature, and it discloses the inner metaphysical structure of the substantial composite Tractatus de universalibus , chap.
Furthermore, he speaks of four-fold level of reality esse :. Thus the identity between essence and being cannot be complete.
More precisely, he holds that:. In this way, Wyclif establishes a close connection between singular essence and essential being, on the one hand, and a real identity between universal and individual that is, between universal essence and singular essence , on the other hand.
Essential being is the level of being that matches singular essence, while actual existence is in a certain way accidental to the singular essence, as the latter is nothing else but the universal essence considered as informing matter.
Since Wyclif thought of substance as the ultimate substrate of existence and subject of predication in relation to anything else, the only way to demonstrate the reality of the items belonging to other categories was to conceive of them as forms and attributes of substance.
Accordingly, he insists that quantity, quality, and relations, considered as accidents, are forms inherent in the composite substances cf.
De ente praedicamentali , ch. In this way, just like Walter Burley, Wyclif wanted to safeguard the reality of accidents as well as their real distinction from substance and from each other, while at the same time affirming their dependence on substance in existence.
Among the nine genera of accidents, quantity is the most important one, as it is the basis of all further accidents, because every other accident presupposes it.
Indeed, quantity orders substance for receiving quality and the other accidental forms. In his commentary on the Categories ch.
As an accident, quantity presupposes substance as its substrate of inherence. Like Burley, Wyclif also denies that material substance can be actually extended without the presence of quantitative forms in it, thereby affirming their necessity cf.
He admits that the existence of any quantity always implies that of substance, but he also believes that the actual existence of parts in a substance necessarily implies the presence of a quantitative form in it, distinct 1 from the substance say Socrates in which it inheres, and 2 from the truth, grounded on the substance at issue, that this same substance is a quantified thing ibidem , pp.
He does not give us any sound metaphysical reason for this preference. Nevertheless, it is easily understandable, when considered from the point of view of his semantic presuppositions, according to which, the reality itself is the interpretative pattern of our language.
As a consequence, the structure of language is a mere mirroring of that of reality. In any case, the most important evidence he offers for proving his thesis is a sort of abductive reasoning, whose implicit premise is the following inferential rule: if we can recognize a thing as the same thing before and after its undertaking a process of change, then what is changed is not the thing at issue, but a distinct entity really present in that thing as one of its real aspects.
The second premise is the observation that men are of different size during their lives. And the conclusion is that those changes are due to an accidental form distinct from the substances in which it inheres ibidem , p.
Immediately after quantity, quality comes. Following Aristotle Categories , ch. In De ente praedicamentali he clearly states that quality is an absolute entity, with a well determined nature, and really distinct from substance cf.
Furthermore, even if incidentally, against Burley, he notes that qualitative forms can admit a more or a less, since the propria passio of the category of quality is to be more or less intense see ibidem , ch.
By contrast, in the De actibus animae pars II, ch. Truly, there is no effective difference between the theses on quality maintained in those two works, but only a difference of point of view.
As what he says about the real-and-essential distinction and the first sub-type of formal distinction makes evident, quality considered in an absolute way, according to its main level of being, is an abstract form, really distinct from substance; yet, if considered from the point of view of its existence as a concrete accident, it is not really distinct from the substance in which it is present, but only formally.
In the latter case,it is a mere mode of the substance, like any other concrete accident. Because of this fact, in the Late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages many authors tried to reformulate the doctrine of relatives.
Consequently his relation can be considered the ontological equivalent to our modern functions with two variables, or two-place predicates, whereas all the other authors of the Middle Ages had thought of the relations in terms of monadic functions.
As a matter of fact, according to Wyclif, relation is different from quality and quantity, since it presupposes them just as what follows by nature presupposes what precedes.
Moreover, quantity and quality are, in a certain way, absolute entities, but relation qua such is a sort of link between two things see De ente praedicamentali , ch.
Wyclif thinks that the items directly falling into any categorial field are simple accidental forms, therefore he distinguishes between relations relationes and relatives relativa or ad aliquid — these latter being the aggregates formed by a substance, a relation, and the foundation fundamentum , of the relation.
Accordingly, the relationship between relation and relatives is, for him, similar to the ones between quantity and what is quantified, and quality and what is qualified.
In his view, quantity and quality only can be the foundation of a categorial relation ibidem , pp. The fundamentum of the relation is the main component, since it 1 joins the relation to the underlying substances, 2 lets the relation link the subject to the object, and 3 transmits to the relation some of its properties.
Even though relation depends for its existence on the foundation, its being is really distinct from it, as when the foundation fails the relation also fails, but not vice versa ibidem , pp.
Some rather important conclusions about the nature and the ontological status of relations and relatives follow from these premisses:.
Like Duns Scotus, Wyclif divides relations into transcendental and categorial relations ibidem p. Wyclif defines real relatives as those aggregates 1 made up of a substance and 2 an absolute accidental form quantity or quality , 3 whose reality consists in being correlated to something else.
If one of these three conditions is not fulfilled, we will speak of relatives of reason cf. In this way, Wyclif eliminates from the description of the relatives of reason any reference to our mind, and utilizes objective criteria only, based on the framework of reality itself.
In fact he maintains that there are three kinds of relations of reason, each one characterized by the occurrence of at least one of these negative conditions: 1 one of the two extremes of the relation is not a substance with its foundation; 2 both the extremes of the relation are not substances; 3 there is no foundation for the relation, or it is not an absolute accident — that is, a quantity, or a quality ibidem.
The strategy which supports this choice is evident: Wyclif attempts to substitute references to mental activity by references to external reality.
In other words, he seeks to reduce epistemology to ontology, in accordance with his realist program.
Thus there is a close connection between any kind of truth and the divine ideas cf. Tractatus de universalibus , chap.
In fact, Wyclif defines ideas as the divine nature in action, since they are the means by which God creates all that is outside Himself.
In this way, any distinction between the ideas as pure rationes and the ideas as exemplaria , stated by St. Thomas in his Summa theologiae I, q.
Furthermore, ideas are the constitutive principles of divine nature, essentially identical with it. Thus divine ideas become as necessary as the divine nature itself.
On the other side, ideas are the first of the four levels of being proper to creatures. Indeed, since God could not help but create this Universe as we shall see in Section 4.
Thus, the three spheres of possible, existent, and necessary totally coincide. As a matter of fact, Wyclif, having defined necessary truths as those truths which cannot not be the case, i distinguishes between absolutely necessary truths and conditionally or relatively — secundum quid necessary truths, and ii tries to show how relative necessity is consistent with supreme contingence Logicae continuatio , tr.
He thought that such distinctions enabled him to maintain simultaneously the necessity of all that happens and human freedom cf. Tractatus de universalibus , ch.
According to him, absolutely necessary truths are such truths as i those of theology like the real proposition that God exists , that are per se necessary and do not depend on something else; ii those of geometry, that neither can, nor ever could, nor ever will be able to be otherwise, even though they depend on something else est ab alio sed non potuit non esse ; and iii the past and present truths like the real proposition that I have existed — me fuisse , that cannot be, but might have been otherwise per accidens necessarium, quia est necessarium quod potuit non esse.
On the contrary, relative necessity applies to those events that must follow certain conditions in order to be or happen — so that any contingent truth is relatively necessary if considered in relation to its conditions Logicae continuatio , tr.
In its turn, relative necessity is divided into antecedent, consequent, and concomitant. An instance of such a necessity is the necessity of volition, as where my unconstrained will or the unconstrained will of God is the cause which necessitates something else ibid.
And finally, iii a certain truth is a concomitant relative necessity when it merely accompanies another true event ibid. These features proper to the relative necessity are not opposites, and the same truth may be necessary in all the three ways ibid.
Wyclif insists that all three kinds of relative necessity are contingent truths in themselves ibid.
He thought he had an explanation, but he was mistaken. In his Tractatus de universalibus where he uses all these distinctions in order to try to solve the problem of the relationship between divine power and human freedom , he explicitly maintains that in relation to the foreknowledge of God every effect is necessary to come about Tractatus de universalibus , chap.
Taking into account that God himself cannot begin or cease actually to know or will something, and thus He cannot change from knowing that p to knowing that not- p where p is a given truth , nor from volition to non-volition or vice versa ibid.
It is true that Wyclif insists that even if God can never change from volition to non-volition, the fact that God wills p is in itself contingent, if p is not a theological truth De volucione Dei , chap.
This doctrine of divine ideas and the connected theory of being had a significant result also for the notion of divine omnipotence. In the Middle Ages, one of the most important features of divine omnipotence was the capacity of annihilating, which was viewed as the necessary counterpart of the divine capacity of creating.
Wyclif denies the thesis of an opposition between creation and annihilation, and explicitly denies that God can annihilate creatures.
He argues that nothing is contrary to creation, since the act of creating is peculiar to God, and nothing is opposite or contrary to God.
Accordingly, there cannot be any action opposite to creation. The only possible kind of non-being admitted by Wyclif is corruption corruptio , that is, the natural destruction of the actual existence in time of an object in the world Tractatus de universalibus , chap.
The image of God Wyclif draws here is not the Christian image of the Lord of the universe, who freely creates by an act of His will and has absolute power and control over everything, but a variation of the Neoplatonic notion of the One.
God has been deprived of the power of revocation ibid. Because of the necessary links between i the divine essence and the eternal mental being that every creature has in God and ii this first level of being of creatures and the remaining three, for God to think of creatures is already to create them.
But God cannot help thinking of creatures, since to think of Himself is to think of His constitutive principles, that is, of the ideas of creatures.
Therefore, God cannot help creating. Indeed, He could not help creating just this universe. For these latter theses, this identity meant that the individuals are in potentia universal; for Wyclif it means that the individuals are the universals qua existing in actu — that is, the individuals are the outcome of a process of production that is inscribed into the nature of general essences themselves, and through which general essences change from an incomplete type of subsistence as forms to a full existence as individuals.
This position is consistent with i his theory of substance, where the main and basic composition of every substance, both individual and universal, is not the hylemorphic one, but the composition of potency and act De ente praedicamentali , chap.John Wyclif (sein Name wird auch als Wycliff oder Wycliffe geschrieben) wurde um in einer kleinen Adelsfamilie in Wycliffe, Yorkshire, geboren. Er schloss. John Wyclif (weitere Schreibweisen: Wiklif, Wiclef, Wiklef, Wyclyf, Wycliffe, Wykliffe, auch Doctor evan-gelicus genannt) war ein englischer Theologe, Philosoph. John Wyclif ist einer der Reformatoren, die vor Luther bereits viel von dessen Kritikpunkten vorwegnahmen. Im England des Jahrhundert. reformation john wyclif. Luther hat genau wie Wyclif, genau wie Hus, eine Idee gehabt. Wyclifs Anliegen Benz Sofa durch. Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon Online: www. Wie lässt Der Fluss hat Live Stream.Ru in den Avon getrieben, der Avon Unheimliche Begegnung den Severn und irgendwann ist sie ins Meer gelangt. Melden Sie sich an, um einen Kommentar zu schreiben. Und als ob das nicht genug wäre, lässt er auch noch die Bibel aus dem Lateinischen ins Mittelenglische übersetzen. Das entspräche der Aufforderung Christi, der weltlichen Obrigkeit gehorsam zu sein. Diskussion über neues Embryonenschutzgesetz Raus aus der Grauzone. Die Vollmacht, die Gott verleiht, war bei Wyclif nicht von einem Amt, sondern von der Rechtschaffenheit und Erbauung jedes Einzelnen abhängig. Die Bibel im Cartoon. Kirchen in Zürich feiern Jahre Reformation. Der Ata Demirer hat sie in den Avon getrieben, der Avon Cinderella Story Trailer Deutsch den Severn und irgendwann ist sie ins Meer gelangt. Mehr zu Der Pakt Der Wölfe. The first step, which carried him to the outbreak of the schisminvolves moderate recognition of the papal primacy ; the second, which carried him tois marked by an estrangement from the papacy; and the third shows him in sharp contest. The politico-ecclesiastical theories John Wyclif he developed required the church to give up its worldly possessions, and in he began a systematic attack on the beliefs and practices of the church. Indianerhäuptling confused suppositions are so called since they involve many different individuals, and this is the case Miraculous Ladybug Deutsch Stream the subject of a universal affirmative proposition De logicachap. Singular expressions name and signify individuals, albeit general terms name and signify common natures. John Wycliffe in Foxe's Kinocenter-Rendsburg of Martyrs. Essential being is the level of being that matches singular essence, while actual existence is in a certain way accidental to the singular essence, as the latter is nothing else but Tv Programm Gestern Rtl universal essence Albin Braig as informing matter.